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TH Congress, 1 SENATE / Keport. 

1st Session. J 'j ^q ^q 



TREATY OF PEACE WITH GERMANY. 



September 10, 1919.— Ordered to be printed. 

^' ?. :~ 

n Mr. Lodge, from the^Committee on Foreign Relations, submitted the 
8 , following 

'/ KEPORT. 

[To accompany S. Doc. 51.] 

The treaty of peace with Germany was laid before the Senate by 
the President on July 10, 1919. Three days were consumed in 
prmtmg the treaty, which was in two languages and filled 537 quarto 
pages. The treaty therefore was not in the possession of the com- 
mittee for action until July 14, 1919. The report upon the treaty 
was ordered by the committee on September 4. Deducting Sundays 
and a holiday, the treaty has been before the Committee on Foreign 
Relations for 45 days. The committee met on 37 of those working 
days, sitting whenever possible both in the morning and afternoon. 
Ihe ei^ht working days upon which the committee did not sit were 
lost owing to unavoidable delays in securing the presence of witnesses 
summoned by the committee. In view of the fact that six months 
were consumed by the peace conference in making the treaty, in 
addition to a month of work by the various delegations before the 
assembling of the conference, the period of six weeks consumed by 
the committee in considering it does not seem excessive. ' 

These facts are mentioned because there has been more or less 

... clamor about delay in the committee. This demand for speed in the 
consideration of the most important subject which ever came before 

.;. the Senate of the United States, involvmg as it does fundamental 
changes m the character of our Government and the future of our 
^ comitry for an unlimited period, was largely the work of the adminis- 
tration and its newspaper organs and was so far wholly artificial. 
Ai-tificial also was the demand for haste dissemmated by certain threat 
bankmg fii-ms which had a direct pecuniary mterest "in securuig an 
early opportunity to reap the harvest which they expected from" the 
adjustment of the financial oblioations of the countries which had been 
engaged m the war. The third element m the agitation for haste 
was iurnished by the unthmkmg outcry of many excellent people 



2 TREATY OF PEACE WiTH GERMANY. 

who desired early action and who for the most part had never read the 
treaty or never o;ot beyond the words "league of nations," which 
they believed to mean the establishment of eternal peace. To yield 
helplessly to this clamor was impossible to those to whom Avas 
entrusted the performance of a solemn public duty. 

The responsibility of the Senate in regard to this tree.ty is equr.l 
to tbf.t of the Executive, who, f.lthough I'.ided by a force of thirteen 
hundred ?.ssist?,nts, expert and otherwise, consumed six months in 
making it, and the Senate and its Committee on Foreign Relations 
rv.n not dispose of this momentous document with the light-hearted 
indifference desired by those who were pressing for hasty and thought- 
less action upon it. The committee was also hampered by the im- 
possibility of se',uring the full inforjnation to which they were en- 
titled from those who had conducted the negotiations. The com- 
mittee were compelled to get su(h imnerfect information as they 
secured from press reports, by summoning before them some of the 
accessible experts who had helped to frame the complicated financial 
clauses and certain outside "\\itn esses. As an illustration in a small 
way of the diffi' ulties in se-'urbig information, it may be stated that 
no provision had been made to supply the Senate with the maps 
5^"C()mpanying the treaty, and it was necessary to send to Paris to 
pj'ocure them. The only documents of the many asked for by the 
committee which were furnished by the Executive were the American 
plan for the league of nations, submitted to the commission on the 
league covenant, and the composite draft made by experts of tliat 
commission. 

The treaties with Poland and vrith France as well as the Rhine 
protocol, all integral parts of the treaty with Germany, were ob- 
tained by the Senate, prior to their transmission by the President, 
from the documents laid before the House of Commons and the 
Chamber of Eenuties early in July by the Prime Ministers of England 
and France. The records of the }:eace conference and of the confer- 
ences of the representatives of the fi\e great powers were asked 
for by the committee and refused by the Executive. The com- 
mittee had beiore them the Secretary of State, v.ho was one of the 
American delegates and a signer of the treaty, and they also had the 
privilege of a meeting with the President at the Wliite House which 
they had themselves requested. The testimony of the Secretary 
of State and the conversation of the committee \7ith the President, 
published in the record oi the committee hearings, have been laid 
before the country by the ]>ress and it is not necessary to say any- 
thing further in regard to them because the people themselves know 
how much information in regcird to the treaty was received by the 
committee upon those tv o occasions. 

The character of the clamor for speedy action is well illustrated 
by the fact that it was directed solel}^ agamst the Senate of the 
United States and its Committee on Foreign .Helations. The treaty 
provides that it shall go mto force when ratified by Germany and by 
three of the principal allied and associated powers, which are the 
United States, France, Great Britain, Italy, and Japan. Great 
Britam very naturally ratified at once, but no one of the other four 
has yet acted. Persons afflicted a\ ith mquu'ing minds have wondered 
not a little that the distressed mourners over delays ui the Senate 



SEP ''h 1919 



'f^^ t) TREATY OF PEACE WITH GERMAJS[Y. 3 

have iicfl also aimed their criticism at the like shortcomings on the 
part of France, Italy, and Japan, an act of even-handed justice in 
faultfinding which they have hitherto failed to perform. 

Perhaps it is well also to note and to consider for a moment one 
of the reasons given for the demand for hasty action, which was to 
'the effect that it was necessary to have prompt ratification in order 
to renew our trade with Germany, for even the most ardent advocate 
of unconsidered action was unahle to urge that the channels of trade 
to the allied countries were not open. The emptiness of this par- 
ticular plea for haste, now rather faded, is shown bv the fact that we 
have been trading with Germany ever since the armistice. Between 
that event and the end of July we have exported to Germany goods 
. valued at $11,270,624. In the month of June we exported more to 
Germany than we did to Spain. In July, by orders of the War 
Trade Board, the provisions of the trading-with-the enemy act were 
set aside by the authorization of licenses to trade, and exports to 
Germany for the month of July amounted to $2,436,742, while those 
to Austria and Hungary were $1,016,518. 

It is an interesting fact that the exports in June in Germany, 
before the relaxation of the trading- with-the-enemy-act, were much 
larger than after that relaxation, broi ght nbout by allowing licenses, 
was ordered, an indication of the undoubted truth that our trade wdlh 
foreign countries is not afiected l;y the treaty, but is governed by the 
necessarily reduced purchasing power of all countries in Europe en- 
gaged in the war. As a matter of fact, therefore, we are trading with 
Germany, and it is a mere delusion to say that we can not trade with 
Germany until the ratification of the treaty, because in order to do 
so we require a new treaty of amity and commerce and the reestal^- 
lishment of our consular system in that country. The United States, 
following the usual custom, was represented in Germany by wSpain 
both in the consular and in the diplomatic service, after the outbreak 
of the war, end we can transact all the business we may desire through 
the good offices of Spanish consuls until a new consular treaty with 
Germany ht s been msde. 

Before leaving this subject it may not be amiss to remark that 
Mr. Lloyd-George has recently made two important speeches express- 
ing grave apprehensions as to the social and political unrest and the 
economic troubles now prevalent in England. He seems to have 
failed to point out, however, that the ratification of the covenant of 
the league of nations by Great Britain had relieved the situation 
which he had described. He was apparently equally remiss in omit- 
ting to suggest that prompt action by the Senate of the United States 
in adopting the covenant of the league of nations would immediately 
lower the price of beef. 

In reporting the treaty to the Senate for action the committee 
propose certain amendments to the text of the treaty and certain 
reservations to be attac^Ied to the resolution of ratification and made 
a part of that resolution when it is offered. 

in regard to the amendments generally it should be stated at the 
outset that nothing is more groundless than the sedulously cultivated 
and constantly expressed fear that textual ainendments would require 
a summoning of the peace conference, and thereby cause great delay. 
There v\'ill be no necessity of summoning the peace conference, be- 
cause it is in session now in Paris, with delegates fully representing 



4 TREATY OF PEACE Jt\'lTlI GERMANY. 

all the signatory nations, as it has been for six months, and it seems 
likely to be in session for six months more. Textual amendments, 
if made by the Senate, can be considered in Paris at once and the 
conference would be at least as usefully employed in that considera- 
tion as they now are in dividing and sharing southeastern Europe and 
Asia Minor, in handing the Greeks of Thrace over to our enemy, 
Bulgaria, and in trying to force u])on the United States the control 
of Armenia, Anatolia, and Constantinople through the medium of a 
large American Aimy. Still more unimportant is the bugbear which 
has been ] ut forward of tlie enormous difficulties which will be in- 
curred in securing the adhesion of Germany. No great amount of 
time need be consumed in bringing German representatives to Paris. 
The journey is within the ] ower of a moderate amount of human 
endurance, and it is also to be remembered that Germany is not a 
member of the league and need not be consulted in regard to the 
terms of the covenant. When German}" enters the league she will 
take it as she finds it. 

AMENDMENTS. 

The first amendment offered by the committee relates to the league. 
It is proposed so to amend the text as to secure for the United States 
a vote in the assembly of the league equal to that of any other power. 
Great Britain now has under the name of the British Empire one vote 
in the council of the league. She has four additional votes in the 
assembly of the league for her self-governing dominions and colonies, 
which are most properly members of the league and signatories to 
the treaty. She also has the vote of India, which is neither a self- 
governing dominion nor a colony but merely a part of the Empire and 
which apparently was simply put in as a signatory and member of the 
league by the peace conference because Great Britain desired it. 
Great Britain also will control the votes of the Kingdom of Hejaz 
and of Persia. With these last two of course we have nothing to do. 
But if Great Britain has six votes in the league assembly no reason 
has occurred to the committee and no argument had been made to 
show why the United States should not have an equal number. If 
other countries like the present arrangement, that is not our affair; 
but the committee failed to see why the United States should have 
but one vote in the assembly of the league when the British Empire 
has six. 

Amendments 39 to 44, inclusive, transfer to China the German 
lease and rights, if they exist, in the Chinese Province of Shantung, 
which are given by the treaty to Japan. The majority of the com- 
mittee were not willing to have their votes recorded at any stage ui the 
proceedings in favor of the consummation of what they consider a 
great wrong. They can not assent to taking the j^roperty of a faithful 
ally and handing it over to another ally in fulfillment of a bargain 
made by other })9wers in a secret treaty. It H a record which they are 
not wdlling to present to their fellow citizens or leave behind them for 
the contemplation of their children. 

Amendment No. 2 is simply to provide that where a member of the 
league has self-governing dominions and colonies which are also 
members of the league, the exclusion of the disputants under the 
league rules shall cover the aggregate vote of the member of the 



TRRATY OF PEACE AVTTn GERMAITY. 5 

league and its self-governing dominions and parts of empire com- 
bined if any one of them is involved in the controversy. 

The remaining amendments, with a single exception, may be 
treated as one, for the purpose of all alike is to relieve the United 
States from having representatives on the commissions established 
by the league which deal with questions in which the United States 
has and can have no interest and in which the United States has evi- 
dently been inserted by design. The exception is amendment No. 
45, which provides that the United States shall have a member of 
the reparation commission but that such commissioner of the United 
States can not, except in the case of shipping where the interests of 
the United States are directly involved, deal with or vote upon any 
other questions before that commission except under instructions 
from the Government of the United States. 

RESERVATIONS. 

' The committee proposes four reservations to be made a part of 
the resolution of ratification when it is offered. The committee re- 
serves, of course, the right to offer other reservations if they shall so 
determine. The four reservations now presented are as follows: 

" 1 . The United States reserves to itself the unconditional right to 
withdraw from the league of nations upon the notice provided in 
article 1 of said treaty of peace with Germany." 

The provision in the league covenant for withdrawal declares that 
any member may withdraw provided it has fulfilled all its interna- 
tional obligations and all its obligations under the covenant. There 
has been much dispute as to who would decide if the question of the 
fulfillment of obligations was raised and it is very generally thought 
that this question would be settled by the council of the league of 
nations. The best that can be said about it is that the question of 
decision is clouded with doubt. On such a point as this there must 
be no doubt. The United States, which has never broken an interna- 
tional obligation, can not permit all its existing treaties to be reviewed 
and its conduct and honor questioned by other nations. The same 
may be said in regard to the fulfillment of the obligations to the 
league. It must be made perfectly clear that the United St tes alone 
is to determine as to the fulfillment of its obligations, and its right of 
withdrawal must therefore be unconditional as provided in the 
reservation. 

"1?. The United States declines to assume, under the provisions of 
article 10, or under any other article, any obligation to preserve the 
teri-itoriat integrity or political independence of any other country 
or to interfere in controversies between other nations, members of 
the league or not, or to employ the military or naval forces of the 
United States in such controversies, or to adopt economic measures, 
for the protection of any other country, whether a member of the 
league or not, against external aggression or for the purpose of 
coercing any other country, or for the i^urpose of intervention in the 
internal confiicts or other controversies which ma}" arise in any other 
country, and no mandate shall be accepted by the United States under 
article 22, Part;, of the treaty of peace with Germany, except b}" 
aetion of the Congress of the United States." 

This reservation is intended to meet the most vital objection to 
the league covenant as it stands. Under no circumstances must 



6 TREATY OF PE4CE WITH GERMANY. 

there be any legal or moral obligation upon the United States to 
enter into war or to send its Army and Navy abroad or without the 
unfettered action of Congress to impose economic boycotts on other 
countries. Under the Constitution of the United States the Congress 
alone has the power to declare war, and all bills to raise revenue or 
affecting the revenue in any way must originate in the House of 
Representatives, be passed by the Senate, and receive the signature 
of the President. These constitutional rights of Congress must not 
be impaired by any agreements such as are presented in this treaty, 
nor can any opportunity of charging the United States with bad 
faith be permitted. No American soldiers or sailors must be sent 
to fight in other lands at the bidding of a league of nations. American 
lives must not be sacrificed except by the will and command of the 
American people acting through their constitutional representatives 
in Congress. 

This reservation also covers the subject of mandates. According 
to the ]>rovisions of the covenant of the league the acceptance of a 
mandate by any member is voluntary, but as to who shall have 
authority to refuse or to accept a mandate for any country the 
covenant of the league is silent. The decision as to accepting a 
mandate must rest exclusively within the control of the Congress of 
the United States as the reservation provides and must not be dele- 
gated, even by inference, to any personal agent or to any delegate or 
commissioner. 

"3. The United States reserves to itself exclusively the right to 
decide what questions are within its domestic jurisdiction, and declares 
that all domestic and political questions relating to its affairs, includ- 
ing immigration, coastwise traffic, the tariff, commerce, and all other 
domestic questions, are solely within the jurisdiction of the United 
States and are not under this treaty submitted in any way either to 
arbitration or to the consideration of the council or of the assembly 
of the league of nations, or to the decision or recommendation of any 
other power." 

This reservation speaks for itself. It is not necessary to follow 
out here all tortuous windings, which to those who have followed 
them through the labyrinth disclose the fact that the league under 
certam conditions will have power to pass upon and decide questions 
of immigration and tariff, as well as the others mentioned in the 
reservation. It is believed by the committee that this reservation 
relieves the United States from any dangers or any obligations in 
this direction. 

The fourth and last reservation is as follows: 

"4. The United States declines to submit for arbitration or inquiry 
by the assembly or the council of the league of nations provided for 
in said treaty of peace any questions which in the judgment of the 
United States depend upon or relate to its long-established policy, 
commonly known as the Monroe doctrine; said doctrine is to be 
interpreted by the United States alone, and is hereby declared to be 
wholly outside the jurisdiction of said league of nations and entirely 
unaffected by any provision contained in the said treat}^ of peace 
with Germany." 

The purpose of this reservation is clear. It is intended to preserve 
the Monroe doctrine from any interference or interpretation by 
foreign powers. As the Monroe doctrine has protected the United 



TREATY OF PEACE "WITH GERMANY. 7 

States, so, it is believed by the committee, will this reservation 
protect the Monroe doctrine from the destruction with which it is 
threatened by article 21 in the covenant of the league and leave 
it, where it has always been, within the sole and complete control of 
the United States. 

This covenant of the league of nations is an alliance and not a 
league, as is amply shown by the provisions of the treaty with Ger- 
many which vests all essential power in five great nations. Those 
same nations, the principal allied and associated powers, also domi- 
nate the league through the council. 

The committee believe that the league as it stands will breed wais 
instead of securing peace. They also believe that the covenant of 
the league demands sacrifices of American independence and so^-er- 
eignty which would in no way promote the world's peace but which 
are fraught with the gravest dangers to the future safety and well 
being of the United States. The amendments and reservations alike 
are governed by a single purpose and that is to guard American 
rights and American sovereignty, the invasion of which would 
stimulate breaches of faith, encourage conflicts, and generate wars. 
The United States can serve the cause of peace best, as she has served 
it in the past, and do more to secure liberty and civilization through- 
out the world by proceeding along the paths she has always foUow^ed 
and by not permitting herself to be fettered by the dictates of other 
nations or immersed and entangled in all the broils and conflicts of 
Europe. 

We have heard it frequently said that the United States ''must" 
do this and do that in regard to this league of nations and the terms 
of the German peace. There is no "must" about it. "Must" is 
not a word to be used by foreign nations or domestic officials to the 
American people or their representatives. Equally unfitting is the 
attempt to frighten the unthinking by suggesting that if the Senate 
adopts amendments or reservations the United States may be ex- 
cluded from the league. That is the one thing that certainly will 
not happen. The other nations know well that there is no threat of 
retaliation possible with the United States because we have asked 
nothing for ourselves and have received nothing. We seek no guar- 
antees, no territory, no commercial benefits or advantages. The 
other nations will take us on our own terms for without us their 
league is a wreck and all their gains from a victorious peace are im- 
periled. We exact nothing selfish for ourselves but we insist that 
we shall be the judges, and the only judges, as to the preservation 
of our riglits, our sovereignty, our safety, and our independence. 

At this moment the United States is free from any entanglements 
or obligations which legally or in the name of honor would compel 
her to do anything contrary to the dictates of conscience or to the 
freedom and the interests of the American people. This is the hour 
when we can say precisely what we will do and exactly what we will 
not do, and no man can ever cjuestion our good faith if we speak now. 
When we are once caught in the meshes of a treaty of alliance or a 
league of nations composed of 26 other powers our freedom of action 
is gone. To preserve American independence and American sover- 
eignty and thereby best serve the welfare of mankind the committee 
propose these amendments and reservations. 

o 



66th Congress, 1 SENATE JRept. 176, 

Isi Session. | ' | Part 2. 



TREATY OF PEACE WITH GERMANY. 



September 11, 1919. — Ordered to be printed. 



Mr. Hitchcock, from the ^Committee on Foreign Relations, sub- 
mitted the following 

VIEWS OF THE MINORITY. 

[To accompany S. Doc. 51.] 

The undersigned members of the Foreign Relations Committee 
unite in urging the early ratification of the pending treaty of peace 
without amendments and without reservations. 

We deplore the long and unnecessary delay to which the treaty 
has been subjected while locked up in the committee whose majority 
decisions and recommendations were from the start a foregone con- 
clusion. They could have been made in July as well as in September 
and would have been the same. 

The industrial world is in ferment, the financial world in doubt, 
and commerce halts while this great delay in the peace settlement has 
been caused by the majority of a committee known to be out of 
harmony with the majority of the Senate and the majority of the 
people. This is government by obstruction as well as by a minority. 

Our export trade already shows the undeniable effects of delay and 
doubt m treaty ratification and peace settlement. For the first 
seven months following the armistice our exjDorts averaged almost 
seven hundred millions per month but in July they fell to five hundred 
and seventy millions of dollars. Europe undoubtedly wants our 
products but can only take them in full quantity if our financial 
institutions provide the credit to bridge over the period necessary to 
restore European industry to productiveness. This private credit 
can not ajtid will not be furnished as long as the peace settlement is in 
doubt. Public credit has heretofore carried this great balance of 
trade. Since; the armistice was signed our Government has advanced 
to European governinents nearly two and one-half billion dollars 
which was almost enough to coyer the balance of trade during' the 
eight mouths _period. _ , •■ " ■ , 

Our Goyernmient/ ■however, has'' a^tJut reached the end of its 
authority giyeh by 'Congress and w^'a'dvance but little more. From 



2 TREATY OF PEA(JE WITH GERMANY. 

now on, if we are to keep up our commerce with Europe, private enter- 
prise must furnish the credit to cover the trade balance till European 
industries get started and are able to pay us with their goods. Peace 
settlement delays and doubts paralyze this revival. If uncertainty- 
continues depression is inevitable. 

The claim by the majority of this committee on page 3 of their 
report that we have exported over eleven million dollars worth of 
goods to Germany since the armistice and without a peace settlement 
is no doubt true. To other countries during the same period we ex- 
ported over five thousand million dollars worth. What was exported 
to Germany as stated by the majority report was practically nothing. 
It is only 14 cents worth of American products for each person in 
Germany in seven months or 2 cents per person per month, yet the 
majority report boasts of it as evidence of trade revival in spite of 
treaty delay. The same statesmen gravely assure us that their 
figures prove that it is a mere delusion to say we can not trade with 
Germany till a peace settlement is made. Two cents per month per 
capita is hardly trading with Germany. 

Referring to the action of the majority of the committee, we unite 
in opposing and condemning the recommendations both as to textual 
amendments and as to proposed reservations. As far as the proposed 
textual amendments are concerned we see no reason to discuss their 
character at length. In our opinion they have no merit, but whether 
they be good, bad, or indifferent their adoption by the Senate can have 
no possible effect except to defeat the participation of the United 
States in the treaty. None of them could by any possibility be 
accepted even by the great nations associated with the United States 
in the war, and none of them could by any possibility be dictated to 
Germany. To adopt any one of them, therefore, is equivalent to 
rejecting the treaty. 

The suggestion on page 4 of the majority report that the peace 
conference is still in session in Paris and could consider any textual 
amendments to the treaty made by the Senate, and that German 
representatives could be brought to Paris for that purpose, indicates 
a total misconception of the situation. The peace conference has 
acted finally upon this treaty. Great Britain has ratified it, France 
is about to do so, and with the action of one other power it will in 
all human probability be in actual operation even before the Senate 
of the United States reaches a decision. Moreover, the peace con- 
ference possesses no further power to "bring German representa- 
tiveiS" to Paris." The power of compulsion has been exhausted. 
Germany was told where to sign and when to sign and when to 
ratify, and Germany has closed the chapter by signing and by rati- 
fying. Germany can not be compelled to do anything more or dif- 
ferent with regard to this treaty by being confronted with an 
amended treaty whether once a month, day, or week. There must 
be a finality to ultimata in a treaty by compulsion. If an amended 
treaty is not signed by Germany then it is in none of its parts bind- 
ing on her. 

To adopt an amendment or to reject the treaty means that the 
United States will sacrifice all of the concessions secured from Ger- 
many by a dictated peace. While these concessions are not so large 
as those which other nations associated with us secure in repara- 

1. ,^' ^- 

SEP *13 1919 



,c| ,<a TREATY OF PEACE WITH GERMANY. / 3 

tions, they are nevertheless of tremendous importance and conhl 
only be secured under a dictated peace. Among- the concessions 
which the United States would sacrifice by the adoption of any 
amendment or the rejection of the treaty may be included the 
following" : 

First. Germany's acknowledgment of responsibility for the war 
and her promise to make restitution for damages resulting from it. 

Second. Germany's promise to us in the treaty that she will not 
impose higher or other customs duties or charges on our goods than 
those charged to the most favored nation and will not prohibit or 
restrict or discriminate against imports directly or indirectly from 
our country. 

Third. Germany's ])romise to us in the treaty that she will make no 
discrimination in German ports on shipping bearing our flag and that 
our shipping in Gei'man ports will be given as favorable treatment as 
Grerman ships receive. 

Fourth. That for six months after the treaty goes into effect no 
customs duty will be levied against imports from the United States 
except the lowest duties that were in force for the first six months of 
1914. 

Fifth. Germany's agreement with rs that the United States shall 
have the ]:>rivilege of reviving such of the treaties with Germany as 
were in existence prior to the war as we may alone desire. 

Sixth. Germany's promise to us to restore the property of our 
citizens seized in Germany or to compensate the owners. 

Seventh. Germany's very important agreement validating all acts 
by the United States and by the Alien Property Custodian by which 
^e seized and proceeded to liquidate $800,000,000 worth of property 
in the United States belonging to German citizens. 

Eighth. Germany's agreement that the proceeds of the sale of 
these properties may be used to compensate our citizens in Germany 
if Germany fails to do so, or to pay debts which Germany or Germans 
owe to American citizens, or to pay American prewar claims against 
Germany for property destroyed and lives taken similar to the losses 
because of the destruction of the Lusitania. 

Ninth. Germany's agreement that she will compensate her own 
citizens for pronerty, patents, and other things belonging to them in 
the United States seized during the war by our Government. 

Tenth. Germany's agreement that no claim can be made against 
the United States in respect to the use or sale during the war by 
our Government, or by persons acting for our Government, of any 
rights in industrial, literary, or artistic property, including patents. 

Eleventh. Germany's agreement that the United States shall 
retain over 500,000 tons of German shipping seized in American 
ports which much more than compensate us for shipping lost during 
the war. 

Twelfth. We would lose our membership on the reparations com- 
mission which will be the most powerful international body ever 
created and which will have enormous control over the trade and 
commerce of Germany with the rest of the world for years to come. 
It not only supervises the use of German economic resources and the 
payment of reparations, but it can restrict or expand Germany's 
imports and distribute much of her desirable exports including 
dyes. In no way can the United States assure itseh against dis- 



•4 TREATY OF PEACE WITH GEEMANY. 

crimination in German imports and financial policies unless we have 
a member upon this great reparations commission. 

These are some, but by no means all of the valuable concessions, 
which the United States would inevitably sacrifice by failing to 
ratify the treaty. This failure would be just as complete if we adopt 
an amendment to it as if we rejected the treaty absolutely. In 
either event, we would find ourselves at the end of the war, it is 
true, but without any peace or terms of peace with Germany. We 
would have abandoned our disgusted associates and we would be 
reduced to the necessity of seeking a negotiated peace with an angry 
Germany on such tenns as she would be willing to accord. 

We are, therefore, without any qualification, against amendments. 
We are aware tliat the claim has been set up that one of the pro- 
posed amendments which relates only to the league of nations does 
not require the assent of Germany. This is based on the fact that 
Germany is not yet a member of the league of nations and may not 
be for several years. The answer is, however, that the league 
covenant is a part of the treaty, and the league which is mentioned 
in many places in the treaty has much to do with German affairs 
even though Germany is not a member. Germany, in agreeing to the 
treaty, has assented to the provisions of the covenant, and one of the 
provisions is that it can only l)e amended by the action of the league, 
which has not yet started, ratified by all the members of the council, 
which has not yet organized, as well as by a majority of the members 
of the assembly. 1 1 is obvious, therefore, if it is to be amended in 
any other way Germany's assent will be just as necessary as to any 
other article of the treaty. 

RESERVATIONS. 

The reservations proposed by the majority of tliis committee are of 
such a character as at once betray their authorship. They are the 
work of Senators organized for the purpose of destroying the league 
and if possible defeating this treaty . Their phraseology is such as 
make this purpose plain. They are in no sense interpretative 
reservations to be used to make clear language in the treaty that 
might be considered doubtful, but they are so framed as to receive the 
support of Senators who desire the defeat of the treaty. While mas- 
querading in the guise of reservations they aie in fact alterations of 
the treaty. They have all the vices of amendments and the addi- 
tional vice of 1 re tending to be what they are not. Presented as parts 
of the resolution to ratifv the treaty they would in fact, if adopted, 
result in its defeat. All of them apply to the league of nations 
section of the treaty. Those who oppbse the league of nations realize 
that it is invincible on a square fight and they hope to destroy it by 
this indirection. 

The league of nations has stood the test of world-wide criticism and 
unlimited attack. It stands to-day as the only ho])e for world peace. 
After all the assaults of many months its purposes and provisions 
stand out clearly defined, unaffected by criticism, and unyielding to 
attack. 



TREATY OF PEACE WITH GERMANY. 5 

THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS. 

The league of nations proposes to organize the nations of the world 
for peace whereas they have always heretofore been organized for 
war. It proposes to establish the rule of international justice in place 
of force. It proposes to make a war of conquest impossible by uniting 
all nations against the offender. 

It is the first international arrangement ever made by which small 
and weak nations are given the organized strength of the world for 
protection. 

It is a covenant between many nations by which each agrees not 
to do certain things which in the past have produced wars and to do 
many things which have been found to preserve the peace. 

It is a working plan for the gradual reduction of armament by all 
members simultaneously in proper proportion and by agreement. 

It sets up arbitration as a friendly method of adjusting disputes 
and inquiry when arbitration is not agreed to. In both cases it pro- 
vides a cooling-off period of nine months during which the differences 
may be adjusted. 

It preserves the territorial integrity and political independence of 
each member and leaves to each the exercise of its sovereign rights 
as a nation. 

It will save the world from wars and preparations for wars. It 
will reduce armies and navies and taxes. 

It will help to remove the discontent with government in all 
countries by making government beneficent and devoting its revenues 
to constructive rather than to destructive purposes. 

It is the only plan proposed to redeem the world from war, pesti- 
lence and famine. The only one by which a stricken world can be 
redeemed from the disasters of the late war and the dangers of 
impending international chaos. Those who dally and delay as they 
seek with microscopes to find some petty flaw in its structure have 
nothing themselves to propose. They have appealed to every 
prejudice and resorted to every desperate method of attack to de- 
stroy this great international ejEfort to establish peace, but they 
suggest nothing in its place. 

They denounce the public demand for energetic action as ''clamor." 
They rail at the President who with the representatives of many other 
nations has devoted months of hard work to a great constructive 
effort to settle the terms and reorganize the world for peace. Finally, 
unable to stem the tide of public demand for the league of nations 
they resort to so-called reservations in the hope that they can destroy 
by indirection what they have found unassailable by direct attack. 

We renew our recommendation that the work of the peace con- 
ference be confirmed, the will of the people fulfilled, and the peace 
of the world advanced by the ratification of this treaty — ■' ' the best hope 
of the world" — ^even if like all human instrumentalities it be not 
divinely perfect in every detail. 

Gilbert M. Hitchcock. 
John Sharp Williams. 
Claude A. Swanson, 
Atlee Pomerene, 
Marcus A. Smith, 
Key Pittman. 

o 



66th Congress. 1 SENATE. | ^}^ri,^'i' 

1st Sesswn. | I 176, Pt. 3. 



TREATY OF PEACE WITH GERMANY. 



September 15, 1919.— Ordered to be printed. 



2^. S, U«^ ^v^ 

" ,- — ■ 

Mr. McCuiviBER, from the Committee on Foreign Relations, reported 

the following 

VIEWS IN DISAGREEMENT WITH THE 
MAJORITY REPORT. 

[To accompany S. Doc. 51.] 

It has always been understood that the purpose of a report from 
any Senate committee was to briefly explain the object of a bill or 
treaty reported and the reasons for any amendments thereto. And 
this has been the general rule adopted by all committees in reporting 
any matter to the Senate. The majority of the Committee on For- 
eign Relations have deviated from this rule in reporting this treaty. 
The great purposes of the covenant upon which 27 nations, the great 
and small of the world, studied and labored for six months in an 
attempt to formulate a plan that would tend to insure good fellowship 
amon^ the nations of the world and prevent another such catastrophe 
as we have just passed through have not been even alluded to. Not 
one word is said, not a single allusion made, concerning either the 

v\ gi'^^t purpose of the league of nations or the methods by which those 

N^ purposes are to be accomplished. 

Y\ Irony and sarcasm have been substituted for argument, and posi- 
v\ns taken by the press or individuals outside the Senate seem to 
command more attention than the treaty itself. While a great 
number of witnesses were called for the purpose of condemning or 
criticizing the treaty, no witnesses were called and no testimony 
sought to elucidate or explain the great purpose of international 
cooperation to prevent war. It is regrettable that the animosity 
which centers almost wholly against the league of nations provisions 
should have been engendered against a subject so important to the 
world's welfare. It is regrettable that the consideration of a matter 
so foreign to any kind of partisanship should be influenced in the 
country as well as on the floor of this Senate by hostility toward 
or subserviency to the President of the United States. No matter 
how just may be the criticism of the course pursued by President 
Wilson, the aspirations and hopes of a wounded and bleeding world 
ought not to be denied because, under our Constitution, the treaty 
must first be formulated by him. 

The purpose of this treaty is, first, to settle the score of this un- 
provoked war, this murder directly and indirectly of about twenty 
millions of the best people of the world, that the ambitions of an auto- 
cratic sovereign, with his Junker following, might be satisfied at the 



2 TREATY OF PEACE WITH GERMATTY, 

expense of the liberty of the other nations of Europe; second, to 
secure an agreement among all of the great nations of the world, a 
compact with and between them all, to combine their councils to 
prevent another such tragedy and to henceforth assure the settle- 
ment of international disputes by arbitration or other peaceful method. 

As the United States, though somewhat belated, performed an 
important part in bringing the war to a successful close, and as the 
United States must be one of the signatory powers to the treaty of 
peace, one can scarcely understand this studied effort on the part 
of a majority of the committee to eliminate the United States as a 
factor in determining any question relating to the final settlement 
of this conflict. Neither can one understand why a country whose 
whole history has been devoted to the advocacy of the peaceful 
settlement of international disputes is suddenly to have its policy 
reversed and to become in efiect an opponent of the only means 
that has ever been attempted to assure world peace, namely, an 
agreement, not between two nations or between two groups of 
nations that they will settle their difficulties by arbitration, but an 
agreement among all nations, that they shall not resort to war with- 
out first submitting their controversies either for arbitration or dis- 
cussion, to a council of all; that no nation shall begin a war of aggres- 
sion against another without such submission, and that if such recal- 
citrant nation does attempt a war of aggression and wrong, the other 
nations to the compact will prevent the consummation of such 
felonious policy. 

There has been written into this compact a great underlying prin- 
ciple which is the very soul of the agreement, that the same code of 
morality which governs people in their relations to each other in 
every highly organized State of the world shall govern nations in 
their relations to each other; that no nation shall rob another nation 
of its territory or its independence; that no nation shall have the 
right to murder the people of another nation for the selfish purpose 
of extending its own domains. 

No statesman, no philosopher, has ever yet given a single reason 
why nations, which are but collections of individuals, should not be 
governed in their international relations by the same code of ethics 
that governs the peoples of communities or States in their internal 
relations. 

For the first time in the history of the world this great advance 
step is attempted. The whole issue is whether nations can so elimi- 
nate their selfish desires, so restrain their national avarice, as to 
accord equal justice to all people. As in the community, every indi- 
vidual assumes to assist in the enforcement of law, in the protec- 
tion of the life, liberty, and property of every other citizen, so in 
this international code of ethics, each nation assumes to do its part in 
guarding the international rights of every other nation. As in every 
State a forum has been provided for the settlement of individual 
disputes, and no individual is allowed the right to disregard the law 
of his community, so in this international compact, a forum is provided 
for the settlement of international disputes, and each nation is for- 
bidden to determine when it may commit an act of aggression against 
another nation until it has at least brought its case into this forum 
for consideration and settlement if possible. 

•7 #f B. 

SEP ..19:1919 



\^\Oi^. TREATY OF PEACE WITH GERMANY. 3 

The instrument is not as complete and as binding as the constitu- 
tion of a State or nation. It still leaves to each nation the right of 
withdrawal, and depends to a great extent u]K)n the moral sentiment 
of each nation to comply with its own obligation or the enforcement 
of such obligation upon a recalcitrant member. It is, however, a 
mighty step in the right direction. Every sentiment of justice and 
morality is on its side. Some of its provisions are yet crude and 
uncertain of application. But the whole purpose is most noble and 
worthy. And, as in our American Constitution, we were compelled, 
in order to form a more perfect union, to depend upon the right of 
amendment, so in this great world constitution experience will un- 
doubtedly necessitate many changes in order to make a more perfect 
instrument that will work for the benefit of humanity. All of these 
noble and lofty purposes have been ignored in the majority report 
or treated with sarcastic disdain or jingoistic contempt. 

Most of the amendments proposed are those which eliminate the 
United States from any part in the conclusion and the settlement of 
this great war in which we took a most noble and conspicuous part. 
They not only seek to isolate the United States as a world power from 
the rest of the civilized nations of the world, but to compel this 
country to abandon its allies and fail in its duties to consummate 
the purposes for which the war was fought. 

The necessity and duty of the United States to assist in the remap- 
ping of continental Europe and western Asia, the creation of a new 
Poland and Czechoslovakia, the revision of the boundaries of Italy 
and Greece, and the expulsion of the Turk from Europe have been 
urged on the floor of the Senate in eloquent words by some of those 
who joined in this majority report. If it was our duty to assist in 
bringing about this result, how inconsistent our attitude in now saying 
that it is not our duty to extend to these countries which we brought 
into being the hand of protection until they can stand without our 
assistance. The purpose of the proposed committee amendment is 
to relieve ourselves of any further duty in protecting these children 
born of the exigencies of this war, and to compel those who suffered 
most in this awful conflict, who are staggering to-day under wounds 
that are almost fatal, to perform that duty without any assistance 
from us. To my mind such attitude is most selfish, immoral, and 
dishonorable. 

It is asserted in the majority report: 

In regard to amendments generally it should be stated at the outset that nothing 
is more "groundless than the sedulously cultivated and constantly expressed fear that 
textual amendments would require a summoning of the peace conference, and thereby 
cause great delay. There mil be no necessity of summoning the peace conference, 
because it is in session now in Paris, with delegates fully representing all the signatory 
nations, as it has been for six months, and it seems likely to be in session for six months 
more. 

No one, so far as I know, has asserted that delegates of this peace 
conference are not still in Paris. They are there for the jmrpose of 
carrying out certain provisions that are in the treaty itself. It 
required six months of arduous labor to bring the minds of all the 
signatory nations to a point where they could sign this treaty. It 
was important that every provision in the treaty sfiould satisfy every 
signatory member. The treaty has been consummated. The hun- 
dreds of experts and advisers who assisted in making the treaty have 



4 TREATY OF PEACE WITH GERMANY. 

returned to their homes. Only ^e skeleton form of the conference 
remains. 

What is claimed by the opponents of these amendments is that 
they would require a reconsideration of the whole treaty because 
they present a new and different treaty. And, realizing the difficulties 
which had to be overcome in order to secure the assent of these 27 
nations, we can not fail to recognize the added difficulties and uncer- 
tainties that would arise in a resubmission of the whole question 
to the peace conference. 

Let us take the first amendment: "t is T^rorosed to increase the 
vote of the United States more than sixfold. The committee report 
says : 

But if Great Britain has six votes in the lea[i:ue assembly, no reason has occurred 
to the committee and no argument has been made to show why the United States 
shou'd not have an equal number. 

If the United States is to have its vote increased sixfold, certainly 
France and Italy will insist upon like additional representation and 
voting power. And undoubtedly every other member will ask the 
same. The unit of representation provided in the league is that of 
the nation without reference to size or importance. Any other basis 
would have been impossible. 

The situation growing out of this great world conflict is unique. 
Every nation that declared it w^as at war with Germany is made a 
party to this treaty, though such nation never furnished a soldier or a 
gun or a single dollar to maintain the war. Hedjaz, with a popula- 
tion scarcely as large as the city of Washington, has the vote of a 
nation. Panama, with a population scarcely larger, has a vote. 
Honduras and Uruguay, each with a population approximating half 
a million, have the same power as Great Britain or France or the 
United States in the assembly. None of them did anvthing to carry- 
on the war. Canada, on the other hand, with a population of nearly 
eight and a half million people, and which fought valiantly through 
all the long years of the war, losing hundreds of thousands of soldiers, 
imposing a mighty burden upon her people for centuries to come, 
asks that she be given a vote in the assembly, not in the council, 
carrying the same power that you give to black Liberia, or Haiti, or 
Hedjaz. Australia and New Zealand, who suffered likewise, and 
whose sons achieved great victories in defense of the great world 
principle which was at stake, ask that there be some forum in which 
they may have a separate vote, eciual to that of these nations which 
did absolutely nothing to maintain this war. While they may be 
said to be parts of the British Empire they are, nevertheless, self- 
governing and independent domains. The tie is one of friendly good 
will and interest rather than of dependency. To all intents and pur- 
poses these countries are independent, self-governing nations. They 
were given a voice only in the assembly, distinct from that of Great 
Britain. They ought to have been given this v^oice in that forum. 
That forum decides nothing in dispute among nations unless the 
nations themselves are willing to have the cause transferred from the 
council. The United States is in no danger from any one of them, 
because, first, she must assent to the transfer of a dispute to the 
assembly, and she will not do so unless she feels that her rights will 
be equally protected in the assembly; second, in every dispute affect- 
ing the Western Hemisphere, these self-governing domains of Great 



TREATY OF PEACE WITH GERMANY. 5 

Britain have always showed a disposition to side with the dominant 
countn^ in this hemisphere, the United States. On the other hand, 
the European countries could complain with far greater reason that 
the United States will so dominate every nation in the Western 
Hemisphere as to have a voting power that would overrule the 
influence or power of the older nations than that the British Empire 
would have a voting power that, would overrule the purposes and 
interests of this country. These nations in the Western Hemisphere 
which declared war against Germany did so to please the United 
States rather than for any effect their action might have on the results 
of the war. France, or Italy, or Great Britain could with as much 
reason say that the United States in every contest with a European 
nation will control Cuha and Panama and practically every Central 
and South American State. But these countries know as we know 
that all disputes between great nations will be settled in the council 
and not in the assembly. 

But there is a third reason why the attempt to increase our voting 
strength is unnecessary and improper. 

It is the British Empire that is represented in the council, where 
every dispute will be settled ; and no self-governing dominion or part 
of that empire has separate representation in the council. And even 
if we should agree, which we need never do, to transfer any dispute 
with Great Britain, or with any of her self-governing colonies or 
dependencies, to the assembly, it would be the British Empire 
and not the separate parts which would be a party to the dispute. 
In other words, a dispute with the dominant member is a dispute 
with each part of the Empire, and a dispute with any part is a dispute 
with the whole, so that even if the dispute between the United States 
and Great Britain or any part of the British Empire were transferred 
to the assembly, the votes of that Empire and each member would 
be excluded the same as our own. This is the construction given 
by the President, and, I think, is the only logical construction. 
But lest there might be any misunderstanding, the construction 
which we claim can be declared by an appropriate reservation in form 
such as reservation No. 6, attached hereto. 

Neither can there be any objection to a reservation which in proper 
language declares that in withdrawing from the league the United 
States must be the sole judge whether all its obligations have been 
fulfilled. 

The only objection to reservation No. 1 is the manner in which it is 
expressed. As worded it would indicate to the world that this 
country assumed the right to withdraw whether its obligations were 
fulfilled or not. If, as stated in the majority report, the United 
States has never broken an international obligation, why use language 
that would indicate a right to do so ? It would be far better and 
far more appropriate to declare that the United States would be the 
sole judge as to whether her obligations under the treaty had been 
fulfilled at the tune of her withdrawal than to indicate a right to 
disregard her obligations. 

The second reservation recommended by a majority of the com- 
mittee is objectionable for several reasons. First, it is an amend- 
ment pure and simple, and an amendment of the most iriiportant 
article in the league of nations. Its pui'pose is to take the United 
States as a power for the peace of the world out of the league entirely. 



6 TREATY OF PEACE WITH GERMANY. 

• 

Our disinterestedness, our freedom from the ordinary jealousies that 
affect the European mind, our power and our resources place us 
in the front rank of influence in this council of nations. We are 
the keystone of the arch upon which must rest the superstructure of a 
successful league of nations. So situated we ought not only to be 
willing but eager to help a distracted world which so needs the moral 
assistance of our membership and the potential assistance of our 
known power. Second, it places this country in a false and wrong 
position, an attitude of encouraging powerful countries to inflict or 
impose any wrong upon weaker nations, by our declared policy of 
nonintervention. The better policy and the right policy is to let the 
world understand that in all probability the United States will not 
stand idly by and allow a great wrong to be perpetrated by one 
country against another. Third, that policy of nonintervention is 
asserted in a dictatorial and offensive way. It is not couched m the 
language which should govern friendly nations in answering proposals, 
one to another. 

Under my construction, and I think under the construction of 
the greater number of those who have studied this league of nations 
provision, the question of interference and extent of interference, if 
any, must finally be decided by the Congress when the occasion arises, 
and no obligation rests upon the United States to interfere in any 
way unless its Congress shall so decide at such time. This com- 
mittee reservation should be modified so as to place this country in a 
proper attitude toward the world, to let the world know that the 
United States is against international crime, and that she can be 
counted upon to throw the weight of her great moral influence in 
favor of right and justice, leaving to the Congress to determine whether 
and to what extent it will intervene when the occasion arises. A 
substitute reservation (No. 2 annexed) will be offered to place our 
coimtry on the moral side of. these great questions, but leaving the 
matter wholly in the hands of the Congress. 

In considering the Shantung amendment the majority report reads: 

The majority of the committee were not willing to have their votes recorded at any 
stage of the proceedings in favor of the consummation of what they consider a great 
wrong. 

In this instance and, it seems to me, in many others the committee 
would prefer to express an idle sentiment rather than accomplish a 
result for the good of China. This declaration is not necessary 
because there need be no conflict between a sentiment favorable to 
China and an act which will imquestionably relieve China from an 
embarrassing situation in which she has placed herself. If the 
committee amendment is adopted, .Japan is thrown out of the league, 
or, more accurately, kicked out of it, by the United States. China is 
made to bi-eak her treaty with Japan. Japan outside the league is 
of course relieved, so far as the league is concerned, from any obliga- 
tion to make good her treaty with China for a return of Shantung: 
and China is in no position to insist upon the fulfillment of a treaty 
which she, with the assistance or by the act of the United States, has 
abruptly and unceremoniously broken. We are met, therefore, in 
this Shantung proposition with a practical question. If China keeps 
her agreement and becomes a member of the league and Japan be- 
comes a member of the league, then Japan must keep her counter 
agreement with China, and that counter agreement is to return the 



TREATY OF PEACE WITH GERMANY. 7 

German concessions to China. This can be made clear by a brief 
statement of the facts. 

In 1898 Germany secured from China a 99 years' lease on both sides 
of the entrance of Kiaochow Bay; a concession on both the northern 
and southern sides of the entrance to the bay, wherein Germany 
could exercise administrative rights; certain islands in the bay and 
islands lying to the seaward, and the right to construct two lines of 
railway in Shantung. 

When the war broke out and Japan took her place by the side of 
the Allies, the project allotted to her was the seizure of the German 
forts and all German rights in China. This she accomplished in a 
few months. China rendered her no assistance whatever in accom- 
plishing this result. Shortly thereafter, and on May 25, 1915, Japan 
secured a treaty from China whereby China agreed that Japan should 
acquire the German leasehold and interest rights which Germany 
had theretofore held. Granted, that China would have preferred to 
have had the Germans ousted without having the Japanese substi- 
tuted for them. But China could not do it and would not make the 
attempt. Japan could do it and did do it, and at no little cost in 
blood and treasure. Whatever Japan took she took from Germany 
and not from China, and long before China became even a paper 
ally. However, China received a very valuable advantage in her 
treaty with Japan over what she held under her treaty with Germany, 
because as a j^art of the treaty, and as a part of the consideration, 
Japan agreed as follows: 

When, after the termination of the present war, the leased territory of Kiaochow Bay 
is completely left to the free disposal of Japan, the Japanese Government will restore 
the said leased territory to China under the following conditions: 

1. The whole of Kiaochow Bay to be opened as a' commercial port. 

2. A concession under the exclusive jurisdiction of Japan to be established at a 
place designated by the Japanese Government. 

3. If the foreign powers desire it, an international concession may be established. 

4. As regards the disposal to be made of the public buildings and properties of 
Germany and the conditions and procedure relating thereto, the Japanese Govern- 
ment and the Chinese Government shall arrange the matter by mutual agreement 
before the restoration. 

That the whole of Kiaochow Bay was to be opened as a commerical 
port is in no way injurious to China. It simply means that all 
nations of the world may carry on trade relations with China through 
that port as through other ports. It is the open-door policy. 

The concession mentioned under No. 2 is simply the right to have 
a place, the same as Great Britain, France, Italy, Belgium and other 
countries have, where the Japanese may maintain a residence district 
under her control. 

The third is a like concession where the nationals of any number of 
powers, if such nationals desire it, may reside. 

The fourth pertains only to buildings and properties belonging to 
the German Government, of no important value and concerning which 
there could be little ground for dispute. 

There is nothing in these conditions to which any just complaint 
could be made, unless it be that the grant is to Japan and not to some 
other nation. 

Now, what great advantage does China secure by this treaty? 
She secures the right of immediate return of these German conces- 
sions to her at the close of this war when 'the treaty shall become 



8 TREATY OF PEACE WITH GERMANY. 

obligatory and the said concessions are left to the free disposal of 
Japan. That does not mean any time, 10 years hence, or 5 years, or 
3 years, or even 1 year hence. It means that as soon as the treaty 
is signed Japan shall begin the process of returning the leased terri- 
tory to China. If Japan should fail to do this, she will have been the 
first nation in the league to break her treaty agreement, both with 
China and with the league of nations, because, under the league of 
nations, she is "held to a scrupulous respect for all her treaty obliga- 
tions. " Her failure to comply with her treaty obligations would be 
a cause for war. On complaint of China the matter would have to 
go to the council of the league of nations. If, in defiance of the recom- 
mendation of that council, Japan still refused to comply with her 
treaty she would be ousted from the league of nations and the nations 
would be compelled to maintain the rights of China. But this is 
on the assumption that China herself comes before the league with 
clean hands and unbroken covenants. If, however, we compel her 
by this amendment to break her treaty she can not insist upon 
Japan performing the conditions of a treaty which she herself has 
repudiated. Japan, being forced out of the league, will be under no 
obligation to conform to any of its provisions. To-day she holds the 
German rights which in effect control the Shantung Peninsula by 
both the right Of conquest and a treaty with China. If we break 
China's treaty we wiU be in no position to compel Japan to yield that 
right of conquest. Great Britain, France, and Italy, by reason of 
their treaty obligations, whereby they agreed that Japan might hold 
what she had taken from Germany, can bring to bear upon her no 
pressure. China wiU then be at the mercy of Japan. We will not 
go to war against Japan to settle a quarrel between Japan and China. 

Our true, as weU as practical, course is to say to China, "Keep 
your o^\'n record clear and your covenants unbroken." Then the 
league of nations can properly say to Japan, "You must keep your 
record clear and your covenant unbroken; and your covenant is to 
return the Shantung German leasehold to China immediately after 
your power to do so has come into existence by the adoption of this 
treaty." 

By this process China wiU not only secure aU the rights which she 
conceded to Germany, with these minor conditions which I have 
mentioned, but will also be assured hereafter against any further 
attempt on the part of any nation to obtain unconscionable rights 
over her or to dismember her empire. 

The declaration by the majority of the committee that the German 
rights were taken from one faithful ally and handed over to another 
ally is far from a correct statement of the case. The German rights 
were not taken from China. They were taken from Germany. Nor 
was China an ally of ours in any sense, either when Japan took the 
German rights from Germany or when she transferred those rights to 
Japan. In fact she never became an aUy except on paper, and that 
about two years later. 

There is but one proper way to proceed and that is, not to break 
agreements but to insist upon nations keeping their agreements. 
And that is China's salvation in this case. 

To the substance of some of the proposed reservations there can be 
no serious objection. But against the manner in which they are 
asserted I do most earnestly protest. They are couched in a defiant, 



TREATY OF PEACE WITH GERMANY. 9 

discourteous, and overbearing manner, and seem intended to express 
a jingoistic spirit that ought to be eUminated from American states- 
manship. 

I phiced in the Record some days ago certain reservations which I 
think should be adopted in lieu of those which have been presented 
by the majority of the committee. Tliese proposed reservations 
introduced by me into the Record cover subjects not referred to in 
the reservations adopted by the committee. I shall make them a 
part of this report. 

The reservations referred to read as follows: 

1. That whenever the two years' notice of withdrawal from the league of nations 
shall have lieen given by the United States, as pro^■ided in article 1, the United States 
shall Ije the solejudge whether all its international obligations and all its obligations 
under this covenant shall have 1)een fulfilled at the time of withdrawal. 

2. That the suggestions of the council of the league of nations as to the means of 
carrying the obligations of article 10 into effect are only advisory, and that any under- 
taking under the proAisions of article 10, the execution of which may require the 
use of American military or naval forces or economic measure, can under the Con- 
stitution be carried out only by the action of the Congress, and that the failure of the 
Congress to adopt the suggestions of the council of the league, or to provide such mili- 
tary or naval forces or economic measures, shall not constitute a violation of the treaty. 

3. The United States reserves to itself the right to decide what questions are within 
its domestic jurisdiction and declares that all domestic and political (juestions relat- 
ing to its internal affairs, including immigration, coast^^dse trallic, the tariff, com- 
merce, and all other purely domestic questions are solely within the jurisdiction of 
the United States and are not liy this co\ enant sulimitted in any way eitlier to arbi- 
tration or t3 the consideration of the council or the assembly of the league of nations 
or to the decision or recommendation of an^' other power. 

4. The United States does not bind itself to submit for arbitration or inquiry by 
the assembly or the council any question which in the judgment of the United States 
depends upon or involves its long-established policy commonly known as the Monroe 
doctrine, and it is preserved unaffected by any provision in the said treaty contained. 

5. That in advising and consenting to the ratification of said treaty the United 
States understands that the German rights and interests, renounced by Germany in 
favor of Japan under the provisions of articles 156, 157, and 158 of said treaty, are to 
be returned by Japan to China at the termination of the present war by the adoption 
of this treaty, as provided in the exchanged notes between the Japanese and Chinese 
Governments of date May 25, 1915. 

6. That the United States understands and construes the words ''dispute between 
members" and the words "'dispute between parties" in article 15 to mean that a 
dispute with a self-gOverning dominion, colony, or dependency represented in the 
assembly is a dispute with the dominant or principal member represented therein 
and that a dispute with such dominant or principal member is a dispute with all 
of its self-governing dominions, colonies, or dependencies; and that the exclusion of 
the parties to the dispute provided in the last paragraph of said article will cover not 
only the dominant or principal member, but also its dominions, colonies, and de- 
pendencies. 

P. J. McCuMBER. 




020 953 355 8 



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Metal Edge, Inc. 2006 RAT. 



LIBRftRY OF CONGRESS 



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